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Kasco Services Corporation ("Kasco") petitions the 
Court under Rule 3 5, Utah R. App. P. , for a rehearing of the 
Court's holding that prospective injunctive relief for Kasco 
would be inappropriate and of little or no value. Kasco does 
not seek rehearing on any other issue. 
I. CERTIFICATION 
Counsel for Kasco certify that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the district 
court's denial of injunctive relief against Larry D. Benson, 
Connie Benson and Robert Benson. Kasco commenced this action 
for injunctive relief and damages based upon contractual 
covenants against post-employment competition entered into by 
Larry D. Benson. 
On March 17, 1989, Kasco filed a verified complaint 
against Larry Benson, his wife Connie Benson, and Tri-B-Supply, 
seeking injunctive relief and damages (R. 2). On the same date, 
the district court entered a temporary restraining order against 
the defendants. (R. 85). On March 21, 1989, following a 
hearing, the district court granted a preliminary injunction 
against Larry Benson. (R. 126, R. 973, pp. 5-11). The district 
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court signed an order of preliminary injunction on April 10, 
1989. (R. 139). Subsequently, Kasco filed four motions: (1) 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Connie Benson and 
Order to Show Cause Why Connie Benson Should Not Be Held in 
Contempt of Court, dated April 7, 1989 (R. 156); (2) Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint (naming Robert Benson, Larry' s son, as 
a defendant and modifying Kasco's claims), dated August 24, 
1989, (R. 353); (3) Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against 
Robert Benson, dated January 5, 1990, (R. 461); and (4) Motion 
for Modification of the Court' s April 7, 1989, Order of 
Preliminary Injunction, dated January 17, 1990. (R. 846). The 
district court denied Kasco' s motions without findings of fact 
or conclusions of law. (R. 942). 
Kasco filed its Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order on May 29, 1990. (R. 948). This Court 
granted interlocutory appeal to Kasco on July 17, 1990, (R. 947) 
and on August 14, 1990, it granted Kasco' s Motion for Injunction 
Pending Disposition of Petition Under Rule 5 and Pending Appeal 
filed on June 20, 1990. (Addendum M). On March 31, 1982, this 
Court filed its decision which dissolved the injunction pending 
appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further 
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proceedings including the determination of Kasco' s damages. A 
complete copy of the Court' s opinion is attached as Appendix A. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Court misapprehend the law and facts when it 
concluded that prospective injunctive relief depends upon 
preserving the status quo and that such relief would be of 
little or no value to Kasco? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Prospective Injunctive Relief Should Not Depend 
Upon Whether The Status Quo Was Preserved 
Kasco requested on appeal that Respondents Larry, 
Connie and Robert Benson be enjoined prospectively for a total 
of eighteen months. (Kasco' s opening brief, p. 35; Kasco' s 
Reply Brief, p. 25). Kasco did so to realize the benefit of its 
employment agreement with Larry Benson. The agreement allowed 
Kasco eighteen months after Larry Benson' s termination to 
consolidate and preserve its good will in the employee hired to 
replace Mr. Benson. (Kasco' s opening brief, p. 32; Addendum A 
to Kasco's opening brief, 11 4.3). The Court's March 31, 1992, 
opinion ("Opinion") confirmed that the agreement's post-
employment restriction is enforceable, not just as to Larry 
Benson, but also as to Connie and possibly Robert Benson. 
(Opinion pp. 2-8). 
-3-
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As the Court observed, either Larry Benson or Connie 
and Robert Benson have remained in business throughout these 
proceedings. (Opinion p. 10). The Court also found ample legal 
authority to provide Kasco prospective injunctive relief. 
However, the Court declined to offer such relief. (Opinion p. 
10). The Court was apparently impressed that the purpose of 
such injunctive relief would not be met and that, even if it 
were, Kasco would realize no benefit: 
Although there is ample legal authority to 
grant prospective injunctive relief, we hold 
that such relief would be of little or no 
value to Kasco in the instant case. The 
main purpose of an injunction is to preserve 
the status quo. That purpose was defeated 
by the trial court' s refusal to grant 
injunctive relief against Connie, Robert, 
and Tri-B-Supply early on. They were able 
to do for Larry Benson what he could not do 
for himself, i. e. , solicit Kasco' s customers 
to become customers of Tri-B-Supply. 
Although this court enjoined Larry, Connie, 
Robert, and Tri-B-Supply from further 
soliciting or accepting business from Kasco 
customers pending determination of this 
appeal, by that time (August 14, 1990), 
nearly eighteen months had expired since 
Benson terminated employment with Kasco. 
Connie and Robert had been free during all 
of that time to erode Kasco' s customer base. 
Since it appears unlikely that any benefit 
would now accrue to Kasco by extending the 
injunction for another six months, we 
decline to do so. 
(Opinion p. 10). 
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The Court implies that where the status quo 
(presumably as it was before any or many customers are lost to 
the breaching former employee) is not preserved early on, 
prospective injunctive relief will not be available. (Opinion 
p. 10). If this were the rule, however, the equitable remedy of 
prospective injunctive relief would not be available at all. 
This is so because only when deserved injunctive relief is 
initially refused (as the trial court refused it here) will the 
aggrieved party, in any context, subsequently seek prospective 
injunctive relief. By the time the right to the initial 
injunction is acknowledged on appeal, things will seldom be as 
they were before the breach. 
Thus, if prospective injunctive relief is made 
contingent upon preservation of the status quo, such relief 
becomes illusory. The result is to allow the breaching party 
11
 to reap the profits of his breach [and] also to render the 
judicial system impotent to redress it, simply by forcing the 
other party to go through lengthy litigation to obtain relief. " 
Roanoke Engineering Sales Co. . Inc. v. Rosenbaum. 22 3 Va. 54 8, 
290 S. E. 2d 882, 886 (1982) (granting prospective injunctive 
relief after breaching party had been allowed to compete 
throughout the proceedings). 
-5-
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The continued survival and profitability of a business 
that took years of hard work to secure should not be made to 
depend on the status quo or the ability of a wrongdoer to delay 
efforts of the business to protect itself. 
B. Whether Prospective Injunctive Relief Would 
Benefit Kasco is a Question of Fact to be 
RSfliaftflefl tQ the Trigul Cwrt 
The second aspect of the Court' s holding on 
prospective injunctive relief concerned the usefulness of such 
relief. If the Court does not reconsider its apparent holding 
concerning when prospective injunctive relief is appropriate 
(discussed above), the Court should remand this second issue for 
findings by the trial court. 
Whether Kasco will benefit from prospective injunctive 
relief is apparently a question of fact. The trial court made 
no findings subject to review concerning this issue. Nothing in 
the record indicates that Kasco no longer has good will to 
marshall, restore and preserve. Indeed, just the opposite is 
true. The existence and value of Kasco' s good will is evidenced 
in part by the number of Kasco customers Bensons have amassed 
after misappropriating and exploiting Kasco' s good will that 
Larry Benson nurtured as Kasco' s agent. See Allen v. Rose Park 
Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608, 237 P. 2d 823, 827 (1951) (an employer is 
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entitled to the good will created by his employee). Finally, 
nothing in the record indicates that further injunctive relief 
would not benefit Kasco. Thus, if this is a question of fact, 
as it appears to be, the Court should remand the issue to the 
trial court to make factual findings concerning whether "any 
benefit would now accrue to Kasco" by prospectively enjoining 
Bensons. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Kasco respectfully requests 
that the Court reconsider its holding denying prospective 
injunctive relief and that the Court prospectively enjoin 
Bensons for at least six additional months. * (Kasco' s opening 
brief, p. 34). 
DATED this 14th day of April, 1992. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Kasco Services Corporation 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Compare Orkin Exterminating Co. , Inc. v. Bailey. 550 So. 2d 
563, 564-65 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(prospective injunction for 
full contract period granted even though certain defendants 
already had been temporarily enjoined). 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Petition for Rehearing to be mailed, 
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Tab A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
Kasco Services Corporation, No. 900260 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
F I L E D 
v . March 3 1 , 1992 
Larry D. Benson and Connie A. 
Benson dba Tri-B-Supply, 
Defendants and Appellees. Geoffrey J, Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Michael F. Richman, David L. Arrington, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff 
Reid Tateoka, Shawn D. Turner, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants 
HQWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
This interlocutory appeal arises out of an action 
by Kasco Services Corporation against defendants Larry D. 
Benson, his wife Connie A. Benson, and Tri-B-Supply for an 
injunction and damages resulting from an alleged breach of a 
covenant not to compete contained in an employment contract. 
We granted this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
In 1982, Larry Benson was employed by Keene 
Corporation. They entered into an employment agreement which 
contained a restrictive covenant that upon termination, 
Benson would not compete for eighteen months. The agreement 
specifically provided that Benson would not 
(i) call upon any Keene Customer for 
the purpose of soliciting, selling, renting 
and/or servicing Butcher Products, 
(ii) directly or indirectly, solicit, 
divert, take away or attempt to take away 
any Keene Customer, or the business or 
patronage of any such customer for Butcher 
Products, or 
(iii) directly or indirectly, engage 
in any manner in the business of the sale, 
rental or servicing of Butcher Products in 
any geographic territory in which [Larry 
Benson] had called upon Keene Customers 
during the period of his employment with 
Keene . 
The agreement further prohibited Benson from using or 
disclosing confidential information. He was given confidential 
customer and pricing lists and was entrusted with preexisting 
customers. The agreement expressly stated that the parties' 
rights and obligations Hbind and inure to the benefit of any 
successor or successors of Keene by • . . merger . . . ." 
Kasco is a successor in interest to Keene, and the rights and 
obligations of Keene were assigned to Kasco. 
In the summer of 1988, following the merger of Keene 
with Kasco, employment contracts were sent to all employees 
including Benson. The preexisting agreements with Keene were 
"restated for the record." Benson refused to sign the 1988 
contract and alleges that he informed Kasco in August 1988 
that he considered the noncompetition covenants "null and 
void.w He- continued, however, to work for Kasco and on 
February 15, 1989, provided written notice that he would 
resign effective March 1, 1989. 
Benson was one of Kasco's top five salespersons. 
Kasco's customers developed a pleasant, ongoing relationship 
with him. In effect, Benson was Kasco in his territory, and 
he was responsible for the goodwill of the business because he 
was the only sales representative in his territory. 
We have previously held that "'a covenant not to 
compete is necessary for the protection of the goodwill of the 
business when it is shown that although the employee learns no 
trade secrets, he may likely draw away customers from his 
former employer, if he were permitted to compete nearby.'* 
System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting Allen y« Rose Park Pharmacy/ 120 Utah 2d 608, 617, 
237 P.2d «23, 827-28 (1951)). 
Jpartly after terminating employment with Kasco, pm a butcher supply business with his wife Connie, competition with Kasco. The business was called 
Tri-B-Supply, and they employed their son Robert. When Kasco 
became aware of this, it brought this action for damages and 
sought a preliminary injunction. The trial judge granted the 
injunction against Larry Benson, finding that the four 
requirements set forth in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy. 120 
Utah 2d at 619, 237 P.2d at 828, had been satisfied.1 
1. The four requirements are that (1) the covenant not to 
compete must be supported by consideration; (2) no bad faith 
(Continued on page 3.) 
Moreover, the court determined that Kasco had also met the 
requirements of Rpfrftins v. Fin1?yr 645 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Utah 
1982), which held that not only must the restrictive covenant 
be necessary to protect the goodwill of the business, but also 
the employer must show that the services rendered by the 
employee are special, unique, or extraordinary.2 
The trial judge determined that the eighteen-month 
time period specified in the covenant began to run in August 
1988, when Benson refused to sign the new employment contract 
and allegedly told Kasco that he would not abide by the 
noncompetition covenant. The judge refused to enjoin Connie 
and later denied Kasco's motion to amend its complaint to add 
Robert as a defendant. We granted an interlocutory appeal to 
review these rulings. During the pendency of this appeal, we 
enjoined Larry, Connie, and Robert Benson, along with 
Tri-B-Supply, from further soliciting or accepting business 
from Kasco's customers. The assertion in the dissenting 
opinion that Kasco did not timely petition for an 
interlocutory appeal is without merit. The April 10, 1989 
order granting a preliminary injunction was not a final order, 
but an interlocutory order, which by its very nature was 
subject to modification. Sfifi Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). In 1990, 
Kasco sought to modify the April 10, 1989 order. This appeal 
was timely taken from the court's refusal to do so. 
TIME FRAME OF THE COVENANT 
Kasco contends that the trial court erred in holding 
that the eighteen months began to run in August 1988 rather 
(Footnote 1 continued.) 
may be shown in the negotiation of the contract; (3) the 
covenant must be necessary to protect the goodwill of the 
business; and (4) the covenant must be reasonable in its 
restrictions in terms of time and geographic area. Allen v. 
Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 2d at 619, 237 P.2d at 828. 
2. Although Benson has not cross-appealed and made an issue 
of whether the requirements of Robbins v. Finlay were met, the 
dissenting opinion raises the question and determines that 
they were not met because Benson was "a route salesman, pure 
and simple." We disagree with that characterization because 
Finlay was a salesman who was free to sell similar products of 
competing manufacturers and did not return to service the 
products he sold. On the other hand, Benson was trained by 
Kasco to service and repair grinders, saws, slicers, and 
tenderizers manufactured and sold only by Kasco. He was 
entrusted with Kasco's preexisting customers and given 
confidential customer and pricing lists. He was given an 
exclusive territory to service Kasco's products and every four 
months called on each of Kasco's customers. Benson was like 
the pharmacist in Rose Park Pharmacy, where all the goodwill 
of the employer was associated with and created by the 
employee. 
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than when Benson actually resigned on March 1, 1989. The 
trial judge reasoned: 
The preliminary injunction will be 
granted to expire 18 months from August, 
i988 because I believe at that time the 
company was on notice that Mr. Benson did 
not wish to retain any restrictive 
covenants in his employment, thereafter, 
the company would be willing to either — 
required to terminate him or deal otherwise 
with him. At that point the restrictive 
covenant would be terminated as to its 
application to Mr. Benson except for 18 
months thereafter. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial judge made no specific findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. The covenant not to compete expressly 
states that the eighteen-month time frame begins to run after 
termination. The trial court's finding that Kasco was Hon 
notice" and the noncompetition covenant began to run in 
August 1988 involves a question of fact and a question of 
law. Since the finding that Kasco was on notice was a 
question of fact, we reverse only if we find it clearly 
erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. Petersen, 810 
P. 2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). However, the effect of that 
notice, which presumably led the trial court to find an 
anticipatory repudiation/ is a question of law which we 
review for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425. 
An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an 
executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal 
intent not to render performance when the time fixed for 
performance is due. Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co.. 20 
Utah 2d 232, 234-35, 436 P.2d 794, 796 (1968). The other 
party can immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a 
breach, or it can continue to treat the contract as operable 
and urge performance without waiving any right to sue for 
that repudiation. United California Bank v, Prudential Inst 
fn, of jfcBTIXirn 140 Ariz. 238, 281, 681 P.2d 390, 433 (Ct. 
App. I9ff3); see also University Club v, Invesco Holding 
Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 3, 504 P.2d 29, 39 (1972). 
Our court of appeals recently noted, "A party that 
has received a definite repudiation from the breaching party 
to the contract should not be penalized for its efforts to 
encourage the breaching party to perform its end of the 
bargain." Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing United California Bank. 140 
Ariz, at 281, 681 P.2d at 433); see also 4 Arthur L. Corbin, 
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forhin on Contracts § 981 (1951). The opinion fully 
explains the "modern rule" of anticipatory breach and the 
outmoded common law "waiver" theory. 
We need not decide here whether Benson's 
announcement that he did not intend to abide by the 
noncompetition covenant was an anticipatory repudiation. It 
makes no difference in this case. If his remarks were an 
anticipatory repudiation, Kasco simply had an election. It 
could treat the remark as a breach, or it could continue to 
treat the contract as operable and encourage performance 
without waiving any rights under the contract. If there was 
no anticipatory repudiation, the noncompetition covenant 
remained in full force. Therefore, anticipatory repudiation 
or not, it was error for the trial court to rule that the 
eighteen months began to run when Kasco was put on notice of 
Benson's intent not to comply with the restrictive covenant. 
The beginning time should have been the actual date of 
Benson's resignation. 
POWER TO ENJOIN DOES NOT REQUIRE PRIVITY 
Kasco contends that the trial court erred by not 
enjoining Connie Benson. The refusal was because she was not 
in privity of contract with Kasco. The court believed that a 
direct contract was a prerequisite to injunctive relief: 
JUDGE YOUNG: . . . and you [Kasco] 
fundamentally have no right to enforce 
anything as to Mrs. Benson in relation to 
this agreement. . . . 
MR. RICHMAN: I would assume that this 
court's order is not precluding us from 
seeking a permanent injunction against 
Mrs. Benson at a later time, just a denial 
at this time. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I don't see that I 
have any basis for having jurisdiction 
over her in relation to a contract at all. 
We have previously held: 
[T]he granting or refusing of injunction 
rests to some extent within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and its 
judgment . . .will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it can be said the court 
abused its discretion, or that the judgment 
s No Qnn?fin 
rendered is clearly against the weight of 
the evidence. 
System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d at 425 (quoting 
Johnson v. Ward, 541 P.2d 182, 188 (Okla. 1975)). The trial 
court's discretion must be exercised consistent with sound 
equitable principles, "taking into account all the facts and 
circumstances of the case." Id. 
Connie Benson is a stranger to the agreement between 
Kasco and Larry Benson. This court has not previously decided 
whether persons lacking privity may be enjoined. An Indiana 
decision holds that "the rule that a stranger to a covenant 
may be enjoined from aiding and assisting the covenanter in 
violating his covenant is supported by an overwhelming weight 
of authority." West Shore Restaurant Corp. v. Turk, 101 So. 
2d 123, 129 (Fla. 1958), quoted in McCart v. H&R Block, Inc.. 
470 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); see also Chemical 
Fireproofina Corp. v. Bronska, 542 S.W.2d 74, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1976) (nonsigning spouse can be enjoined if "under the 
circumstances it is reasonable to enjoin a stranger to a 
covenant from aiding and assisting the covenantor in violating 
his contract or receiving any benefits therefrom"); Arwell 
Division of Orkin Exterminating CQt v, Kendrick, 131 ill. App. 
2d 632, 633, 267 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1971); Madison v. LaSene, 44 
Wash. 2d 546, 559, 268 P.2d 1006, 1013 (1954); Ingredient 
Technology Corp. v. Nay* 532 F. Supp. 627, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
More recently/ the Nevada Supreme Court followed the 
reasoning of McCart that the "better, and, apparently, 
majority view allows a party not privy to a covenant not to 
compete to be enjoined, if that party breaches the covenant in 
active concert with the principal party enjoined and with 
knowledge of the covenant." Las Vegas Novelty, Inc. v. 
Fernandez, 787 P.2d 772, 774 (Nev. 1990). The court found 
support for its ruling in Nevada's injunction rule, which is 
substantially the same as our rule on injunctions, Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65A(d). Our rule provides: 
Every order granting an injunction and 
every restraining order . . . is binding 
only upon the parties to the action, their 
officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys, and upon those persons in active 
concert or participation with them who 
receive actual notice of the order by 
personal service or otherwise. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(d) (emphasis added).3 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A has been substantially 
revised effective September 1, 1991. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A 
(Continued on page 7.) 
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The Nevada court further added: "NRCP 65(d) is not 
precisely on point, because it addresses the scope of 
enforcement of an injunction after the injunction has been 
properly issued. Nevertheless, this section makes no mention 
of a privity requirement and provides significant support for 
the majority view." Las Vegas Novelty, Inc. v. Fernandez, 
787 P.2d at 774. 
We find the Nevada court's analysis to be equally 
applicable in our jurisdiction and therefore adopt its 
position that in the appropriate circumstances, a third party 
may be enjoined if it is shown to be aiding or assisting the 
covenantor in violating the noncompetition agreement and with 
knowledge of the covenant. 
In the instant case, evidence was presented that 
Connie Benson was in fact aiding or assisting her husband in 
violating the noncompetition agreement. Ten days after 
Benson's resignation, a letter on Tri-B-Supply letterhead was 
sent to potential customers, many of which were Kasco 
customers. The letter read in part: 
Dear friend, 
We would like to inform you that we 
have started our own business . . . . 
We will be contacting you soon in 
hopes to supply you with your service 
needs. 
We will be operating our [routes] on 
a 3 month service program in order to give 
you more frequent service and to provide 
for your needs in a more efficient manner. 
Because of decreased over head costs 
we will be able to provide less expensive 
service in the future . . . . 
Thank you for your support in the 
past and look forward to serving you in 
the future. 
Sincerely, 
Connie A. Benson, President 
Larry D. Benson, Service Rep. 
(Footnote 3 continued.) 
(Supp. Aug. 1991); see alSQ Mark W. Dykes, Injunctions Under 
Revised Rule of Civil Procedure 65A, Utah B.J., Aug.-Sept. 
1991, at 17. 
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It is clear that there was concerted action from the 
very beginning by Larry and Connie Benson. Her conduct is a 
good example of aiding or assisting a covenantor in violating 
a restrictive covenant and with knowledge of the covenant• 
Therefore, we conclude that it was error not to enjoin Connie 
Benson. 
Soon after the trial court enjoined Larry Benson but 
refused to enjoin his wife, another letter was sent to former 
Kasco customers who had recently become customers of 
Tri-B-Supply. This letter states in part: 
This is to inform you that Larry 
Benson has a Restraining Order against him 
and cannot service in the area for the 
period of 1 year. 
However I would like to inform you 
that I am operating with my son Robert L. 
Benson, who is very capable of handling 
your service needs to operate our new 
business . . . . 
Sincerely, 
Connie A. Benson 
Robert L. Benson 
The letter also mentioned that Robert had received training in 
the service and repair of grinders, saws, slicers, and 
tenderizers. Again, there is evidence of concerted action. 
Had the trial court granted Kasco's motion to add Robert as a 
defendant, Kasco may have been able to adduce sufficient 
evidence of concerted action for which an injunction would lie 
against him. 
PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Kasco next contends that it is entitled to 
prospective injunctive relief for another six months because 
it was not given full opportunity to restore its goodwill. 
Benson was enjoined for only twelve months, and Connie and 
Robert were not enjoined at all. Benson asserts that the 
issue is moot because the eighteen-month period expired during 
the pendency of this appeal. 
Some state courts have held that a request for an 
injunction is moot when the underlying agreement has expired 
by its own terms. See Professional Business Servs.. Inc. v. 
Gustafson, 285 Or. 307, 310, 590 P.2d 729, 730 (1979). 
Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals has held that 
injunctive relief is "inappropriate and manifestly unfair" 
when the restrictive covenants have expired by their own 
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terms. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlmanf 19 Wash. App. 
670, 688, 578 P.2d 530, 540 (1978). The court concluded that 
money damages would be the appropriate remedy. id. 
The Seventh Circuit is in accord with the above cases 
in their holdings of mootness. However, their reasoning is 
based upon constitutional grounds: 
Because this appeal was heard more than 
eleven weeks after the end-date of the 
injunction, we raised the threshold issue 
of mootness. Article III of the 
Constitution requires that federal courts 
only decide disputes that present a "Case 
or Controversy." Because the preliminary 
injunction Brown appealed from expired 
under its own terms, the issues decided by 
the trial court pertaining to the propriety 
of a preliminary injunction have "lost 
. . . [their] character as a present, live 
controversy of the kind that must exist if 
we are to avoid advisory opinions on 
abstract propositions of law." 
Henco. Inc. v. Brown, 904 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S. Ct. 200, 
201-02, 24 L. Ed. 2d 214, 218 (1969)). 
The Tenth Circuit has held that under their plenary 
power and an inherent power to do equity, prospective 
injunctive relief may be appropriate. Kodekey Electronics, 
Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 500 F.2d 110, 112-13 (10th Cir. 
1974). The Kodekev court further added that if prospective 
relief were not granted, the employer would "in effect be 
deprived of the benefit of the non-competition agreement 
because of the stays sought . . . and granted to postpone the 
effect of the original injunction." Id. at 112. 
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia enjoined a 
former employee of a corporation under a noncompetition 
agreement for the time specified even though the time period 
in the covenant had run, because the employee had 
successfully opposed the injunction. Roanoke Ena'a Sales Co. 
v. Rosenbaum. 290 S.E.2d 882, 886 (Va. 1982). Similarly, in 
a Florida case, an injunction under a noncompetition 
agreement was held to run from the order date following 
remand, not from the date of termination, because the trial 
court did not provide the full period of injunction. Orkin 
Exterminating Co. v. Bailey, 550 So. 2d 563, 564-65 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
A finding of mootness would in effect reward the 
breach of the noncompetition covenant, "encourage protracted 
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litigation, and provide an incentive to dilatory tactics." 
Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d at 886. Moreover, this would also 
"render the judicial process impotent to redress" the reward 
for a breach, "simply by forcing the other party to go 
through lengthy litigation to obtain relief," Jjj. 
Although there is ample legal authority to grant 
prospective injunctive relief, we hold that such relief would 
be of little or no value to Kasco in the instant case. The 
main purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo. 
That purpose was defeated by the trial court's refusal to 
grant injunctive relief against Connie, Robert, and 
Tri-B-Supply early on. They were able to do for Larry Benson 
what he could not do for himself, :.e., solicit Kasco's 
customers to become customers of Tri-B-Supply. Although this 
court enjoined Larry, Connie, Robert, and Tri-B-Supply from 
further soliciting or accepting business from Kasco customers 
pending determination of this appeal, by that time (August 
14, 1990), nearly eighteen months had expired since Benson 
terminated employment with Kasco. Connie and Robert had been 
free during all of that time to erode Kasco's customer base. 
Since it appears unlikely that any benefit would now accrue 
to Kasco by extending the injunction for another six months, 
we decline to do so. Kasco's damage claim is pending in the 
trial court. Damages can now be determined with reasonable 
certainty at this point in the litigation. Therefore, 
Kasco's claim for prospective injunctive relief is denied. 
LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Finally, Kasco seeks relief from the trial court's 
denial of leave to amend its complaint to add Robert as a 
defendant and to assert claims against him and additional 
claims against Larry and Connie Benson. The standard of 
review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of 
discretion. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 
86, 91 (1963). Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states in part that leave to amend "shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." We have held, "A primary 
consideration that a trial judge must take into account in 
determining whether leave should be granted is whether the 
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having 
an issue adjudicated for which he had not had time to 
prepare.* Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 
(Utah 1983). 
The record does not disclose why leave to amend was 
not granted. Defendants advance no argument that they would 
be prejudiced by the addition of issues. It may have been 
that the trial court thought Robert could not be enjoined 
because privity of contract was lacking. However, we have 
held earlier in this opinion that in proper instances, 
privity is not necessary for injunctive relief. Defendants 
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now suggest that the amendments sought were properly denied 
because they were futile and offered in bad faith. See 
Christiansen v. Utah Transit Auth.. 649 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah 
1982). We cannot say that Kasco's attempt to seek relief 
against Robert was futile. Likewise, we find no indication 
of bad faith. We thus conclude that it was an abuse of 
discretion to deny Kasco's motion to amend. 
The case is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The injunction 
heretofore entered by this court is dissolved. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
STEWART. Justice: (Dissenting) 
I dissent. First, Kasco's appeal was untimely, and 
this Court is without jurisdiction. Second, this appeal is 
moot because the eighteen-month injunction period has long 
ago expired, even from the time of Benson's termination of 
employment and under the most liberal policy for extending 
that period. Third, assuming that the merits of the appeal 
are properly before the Court, I submit that the majority 
errs in ruling that the trial court made adequate findings 
under Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), in support 
of the injunction. In any event, the requirements of Finlay 
were not met. In my view, the majority opinion eviscerates 
Finlay and, in effect, allows noncompetition agreements to be 
enforced in virtually any case involving salespersons 
competinf against former employers. 
I 
We granted Kasco's petition for an interlocutory 
appeal pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Under that rule, a petition for an interlocutory 
appeal must be filed within twenty days from the entry of the 
order appealed from. Kasco filed its petition for 
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial on May 9, 
1990, of Kasco's motion to modify a preliminary injunction. 
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The preliminary injunction had been entered previously on 
April 10/ 1989. The petition for interlocutory appeal was 
filed May 29, 1990, within twenty days of the denial of the 
motion to modify, but over one year after the entry of the 
injunction. The timeliness of the petition for interlocutory 
appeal turns on whether the petition should have been filed 
within twenty days of the entry of the injunction or within 
twenty days of the denial of the motion to modify. 
One of Kasco's contentions on the merits of this 
appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that the 
eighteen-month injunction enforcing the noncompetition 
covenant should have run from March 1, 1989, when Larry 
Benson was terminated, not from August 1988 when, arguably, 
there was an anticipatory breach of the covenant by Benson. 
That, however, was one of the issues the trial court 
adjudicated on April 10, 1989, when the injunction was first 
entered. Kasco failed to file a petition for interlocutory 
appeal within twenty days of that order. Instead, it waited 
for nearly a year to file its motion to modify the 
preliminary injunction in which it reargued the exact issue, 
together with other issues unrelated to this basic issue. 
When Kasco lost, it petitioned for interlocutory review of 
the denial of the motion to modify. But re-raising the issue 
of when the injunction should begin to run was not really a 
modification issue all, as the majority blithely assumes. 
That issue had been ruled on when the injunction was issued. 
Kasco's strategy should not be allowed to succeed. 
Motions to reconsider cannot extend the time for filing an 
appeal, Peay v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980), unless 
they can be deemed motions for a new trial, Watkiss & 
Campbell v. FQA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1991). 
In considering the motion to modify, the trial court did not 
treat it as a motion for a new trial. 
Even if Kasco's motion could be deemed a motion for 
new trial, it was not filed within ten days of the trial 
court's order as required by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e). Nor was it the equivalent of any other 
motion that might extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. §ft£ Utah R. App. P. 4(b); Watkiss & Campbell. 808 
P.2d at »65 & n.ll. 
'Kasco asserts that its petition was timely filed 
because a trial court has the prerogative, either on its own 
motion or on application of a party, to correct an order at 
any time if entered by "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, as provided by Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P," and 
cites as support Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 
(Utah 1978). However, Kasco has never contended that it 
filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, and, in any event, the motion to modify was not 
filed within three months of entry of the order, as required 
by Rule 60(b)(7). 
Kasco also argues that because this Court granted 
the petition for an interlocutory appeal, the jurisdictional 
issue must be deemed to have been decided- That is not the 
case. Petitions for interlocutory appeal are disposed of on 
the papers in a summary fashion. The jurisdictional 
question, although referred to in those papers, has not 
heretofore been squarely presented- It is now properly 
before the Court. 
The majority simply concludes that because a 
preliminary injunction Hby its very nature" is subject to 
modification, Kasco's appeal from denial of its motion to 
modify is timely. Supra at 3- The unfortunate result of the 
majority's position is that a party may now use a motion to 
modify an injunction as a means to extend indefinitely the 
time to file an out-of-time petition for interlocutory appeal 
of the grant of a motion for a preliminary injunction and 
thereby subvert the time limitation in Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 
II 
On the merits, the majority holds that Kasco is 
entitled to an injunction against Larry D. Benson, his wife 
Connie A. Benson, and their son Robert Benson and that under 
Larry Benson's employment contract, the eighteen-month 
noncompetition injunction should run from the date Benson 
terminated his employment, rather than from the date that 
Kasco was put on notice of Benson's intent not to comply with 
the covenant not to compete. 
To obtain injunctive relief under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65A(e), the movant must by argument and evidence 
convince the trial court that the requirements have been 
met. System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 
1983). When the instant case was adjudicated, Rule 65A(e) 
provided that an injunction may be granted on the following 
bases: 
(1) when it appears by the pleading on 
file that a party is entitled to the 
relief demanded, and such relief, or any 
part thereof, consists in restraining the 
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be modified after 
it goes into effect. However, the law is that a movant must 
first show some change in circumstances. Kasco has not 
alleged any changed circumstances that bear upon the issue of 
when the injunction should have commenced. 
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commission or continuance of some act 
complained of, either for a limited period 
or perpetually; 
(2) when it appears from the pleadings 
or by affidavit that the commission or 
continuance of some act during the 
litigation would produce great or 
irreparable injury to the party seeking 
injunctive relief; 
(3) when it appears during the 
litigation that either party is doing or 
threatens, or is about to do, or is 
procuring or suffering to be done, some 
act in violation of the rights of another 
party respecting the subject matter of the 
action, and tending to render the judgment 
ineffectual; 
(4) in all other cases where an 
injunction would be proper in equity. 
Thus, Kasco had to show that it was entitled to the relief it 
demanded. 
Speaking to the validity of the trial court's 
determination that an injunction was warranted, the majority 
holds that all the requirements for issuing the injunction 
were met. That simply is not the case. The majority ignores 
a fundamental and blatantly obvious defect in the trial 
court's findings. The majority asserts that "the [trial] 
court determined that Kasco had also met the requirements of 
Robbins v, Finlav. 645 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Utah 1982) . . . ." 
Supra at 2-3. The majority is flatly wrong. 
In a general discussion of relevant legal 
principles, the trial court did refer to Finlay. In making 
its findings in support of the injunction, however, the trial 
court made no findings whatsoever pertaining to the standards 
established in Finlay. The trial court simply found that the 
covenant not to compete was enforceable as a matter of 
black-lifter contract law, that the covenant was necessary to 
protect fch« goodwill of the business, and that the 
restrictions of the covenant were reasonable as to time and 
area: 
They being number one, that the covenant 
must be supported by consideration. That 
requirement is met. 
Number two, that no bad faith be shown in 
the negotiations of the contract. I 
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believe, likewise, even though some did 
not wish to sign the contract under the 
circumstances of its presentation, that 
requirement also was met. 
Number three, the covenant be necessary to 
protect the goodwill of the business and, 
number four, that it be reasonable in its 
restrictions in terms of time and area. I 
believe each of those requirements is met 
in this contract and thus the preliminary 
injunction will be granted. 
The injunction was patently unlawful on the face of this record 
because the trial court failed to make the essential finding 
under Finlay that Benson was not engaged in a common calling 
and that Kasco had a legally protectible interest. Before I 
discuss Finlay, however, a second point must be made. 
The majority opinion states, "We have previously held 
that '"a covenant not to compete is necessary for the 
protection of the goodwill of the business when it is shown 
that although the employee learns no trade secrets, he may 
likely draw away customers from his former employer, if he were 
permitted to compete nearby.W,H Supra at 2 (quoting System 
Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (quoting 
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 2d 608, 617, 237 p.2d 
823, 827-28 (1951))). The majority's quotation from Rose Park 
is overly selective and ignores the subsequent modification of 
the 1951 Rose Park holding. Indeed, in the very next paragraph 
in System Concepts, this Court stated: 
Under the Rose Park reasoning, this 
goodwill alone would be considered a 
protectible interest which SCI could 
justifiably secure through a restrictive 
covenant. More recently, however, this 
Court has held that to justify enforcement 
of a restrictive employment covenant by 
injunctive relief the employer must show 
not only goodwill, but that the services 
rendered by the employee were special/ 
unique or extraordinary. 
669 P.2d at 426 (citing Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627-28 
(Utah 1982)). In truth, the covenant in the instant case does 
nothing more than baldly restrain competition, which it may not 
do. £££ Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-l-A Corp.. 369 
N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1977). The point the majority misses is that 
any competition with a former employer will always have an 
effect upon that employer's goodwill, if goodwill is defined in 
terms of gross sales. On that view, all covenants not to 
compete seek to protect an employer's goodwill, no matter how 
common the calling in which the employee is engaged. Under the 
majority's rule, therefore, virtually every covenant not to 
compete is enforceable, irrespective of how oppressive the 
restriction is on the employee's freedom to contract and work. 
Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), 
constituted a major modification of the rule laid down in Rose 
Park.2 Finlay recognized that employees who engage in common 
callings have property interests in their labor and the right 
to pursue a chosen occupation for the benefit of themselves and 
their dependents. Such employees necessarily learn some 
aspects of their employer's business which would enable them to 
compete in selling products or services of the type sold by the 
employer. An employee's acquisition of general knowledge or 
expertise and its use on behalf of a competitor after the 
employee leaves the first employer, however, does not represent 
unfair, unethical, or improper conduct. Indeed, the 
acquisition of knowledge and ability is the natural and 
inevitable by-product of pursuing one's chosen occupation. It 
may be that an employee first learns an occupation by 
performing the duties of his employment. But even that does 
not vest the employer with any interest in the employee's 
knowledge, labor, or expertise. This has long been the 
protection the common law has accorded individuals engaged in 
common callings. It would be highly exploitive of persons 
engaged in common callings, such as salespersons, to allow an 
employer to restrain them from earning a livelihood simply 
because, in some degree or another, the goodwill of the 
employer tends to rub off onto employees or because some degree 
of employer goodwill was created by the employees in the course 
of discharging their duties. The law does not allow that. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 627. 
Thus, Finlay stands for the proposition that employers 
may not use covenants not to compete to prevent competition 
from former employees who engaged in common callings, such as 
selling, even if the employee can compete more effectively 
because of their employment. See also Reed, Roberts ASSOCS,, 
ingf vy Stravroan, 353 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976); Ames Distributing 
Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
The right to earn a living by engaging in a common 
calling is a fundamental right which the law must jealously 
protect. In Finlay, on facts somewhat similar to the instant 
case, we stated: 
The record shows that Finlay's job 
required little training and is not unlike 
the job of many other types of salesmen. 
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a professional 
person solely responsible for building the business of a small 
neighborhood pharmacy. 
The company's investment in training him 
was small. In fact, he had previously 
worked as a Beltone salesman for other 
dealers in Canada. Furthermore, there is 
no showing that his services were special, 
unique, or extraordinary, even if their 
value to his employer was high. Thus, 
this case is similar to Columbia Ribbon & 
Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-l-A Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 
496, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 369 N.E.2d 4 
(1977) where the court stated: 
It is clear that [the covenant's] 
broad-sweeping language is 
unrestrained by any limitations keyed 
to uniqueness [of the employee's 
services], trade secrets, 
confidentiality or even competitive 
unfairness. It does no more than 
badly restrain competition. This it 
may not do. fid., 398 N.Y.S.2d at 
1006, 369 N.E.2d at 6.] 
It is of no moment that defendant may 
have been especially proficient in his 
work. General knowledge or expertise 
acquired through employment in a common 
calling cannot be appropriated as a trade 
secret. "The efficiency and skills which 
an employee develops through his work 
belong to him and not to his former 
employer." Hallmark Personnel of Texas, 
Inc. v. Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d 
933, 936 (1978). The same principles 
apply to the covenant here. We hold that 
the covenant not to compete had the effect 
of preventing the defendant from 
exploiting skills and experience which he 
had a right to exploit. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted). 
The trial court and the majority ignore the 
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If the trial 
court had correctly applied Finlay to the facts of this case, 
Kasco could not have made the requisite showing under 
Rule 65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief demanded. 
Finlay requires that before a trial court can conclude that a 
covenant not to compete is enforceable, it must first 
determine that the employee was not engaged in a common 
calling and that the employer has a legally protectible 
interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at 627. A generalized assertion 
that preventing the completion of a former employee will 
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protect the employer's goodwill is not enough, id. at 
627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 426. 
In this case, defendant Larry Benson was a salesman 
of butcher supplies. He was a route salesman, pure and 
simple. He covered a rural territory in Utah and Idaho. He 
had no trade secrets. He was not involved in management. As 
a result of his common calling, he necessarily knew both the 
actual and potential customers for the goods he sold in the 
communities of his territory. Customers of butcher supplies 
in such areas are not hard to find; a scan of local telephone 
books would quickly identify them. Finally, Kasco's 
customers are not found on a secret customer list. 
The majority does not even address the issue of 
whether Benson was engaged in a common calling. It rests 
solely on the specious rationale that in his territory, 
Benson was Kasco. Route salespersons are commonly viewed in 
their territories as representatives of their employers. But 
that is no reason to hold them in semi-bondage to their 
former employers when they change jobs. The majority notes 
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five salespersons. The 
law, however, does not protect only less able individuals. 
The consequence of the majority's ruling is that a 
noncompetition covenant may be enforced against any route 
salesperson whenever it could be said that the employer may 
lose some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former employee is 
not restrained from competing. That, of course, can be said 
with respect to all route salespersons, no matter how common 
their callings. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Stewart. 
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